Was the 30th September Movement instigated by the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) or officials within the Army?

This investigation will explore the question: Was the 30th September Movement instigated by the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) or officials within the Army?

The sources to be examined are "Some Factors that Influenced the Demise of the "September 30th Movement" as Viewed from a Military Perspective," written by Brigadier General Supardjo in 1966, and "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia," written by Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey and published in 1971. The first source implies that the PKI was actively involved, whilst the second argues that the movement was solely an internal army matter, making the two sources pertinent.

The second source is noteworthy due to its place of origin because, at the time they published their paper in 1966, Anderson and McVey were both doctoral students at Cornell University researching Indonesia. Anderson has the necessary credentials and a position in academia as a political scientist and professor of international studies. By emphasizing the political turbulence and complexity of the Indonesian military, the source aims to give a different perspective on the coup's status as an internal army matter. Since the movement itself claimed that it was solely a military matter, it is valuable in terms of substance because it is based on contemporaneous transcripts created by the movement.

The initial source has value because of where it came from. A valuable first-hand account is provided by the author, Brigadier General Supardjo, a conspirator present at Halim Air Base on the day of the movement and had written his analysis for colleagues before his arrest on January 12, 1967. The document's goal is particularly valuable since, as a post-mortem investigation, it identifies all coup participants and demonstrates the PKI's involvement in the incident. Its content is also noteworthy since it makes explicit claims about PKI involvement and leadership, such as "an operation that was led directly by the party."

However, the source is limited based on its origin. Supardjo was not a core organiser, serving a more supplementary role. His unfamiliarity with the initial planning stages could have thus hindered his analysis. In addition, its purpose is limited as Supardjo intended his document to explain tactical errors made by coup leaders rather than seek out those responsible for it. The document’s contents are also limited by its omission of details regarding the initial planning stages. In Supardjo’s own words, “compared to the length of time of all the preparations, the time of my involvement was very brief” and records only what he could witness, the day of the coup and the days directly before and after.

The second source is valuable based on origin since both Anderson and McVey were graduate students from Cornell University studying Indonesia when they wrote their paper in 1966. Anderson was a political scientist and professor of international studies and thus has the proper credentials and academic appointment. The source is also valuable in purpose since it intends to present an alternate view of the coup being an internal army affair by focusing on the political volatility and complexity of the Indonesian military. It is valuable content wise since it is based on contemporary transcripts made by the movement, who themselves asserted that it was entirely an affair within the military.

However, the source is limited based on its origin. Supardjo was not a core organiser, serving a more supplementary role. His unfamiliarity with the initial planning stages could have thus hindered his analysis. In addition, its purpose is limited as Supardjo intended his document to explain tactical errors made by coup leaders rather than seek out those responsible for it. The document’s contents are also limited by its omission of details regarding the initial planning stages. In Supardjo’s own words, “compared to the length of time of all the preparations, the time of my involvement was very brief” and records only what he could witness, the day of the coup and the days directly before and after.

The second source is valuable based on origin since both Anderson and McVey were graduate students from Cornell University studying Indonesia when they wrote their paper in 1966.14 Anderson was a political scientist and professor of international studies and thus has the proper credentials and academic appointment. The source is also valuable in purpose since it intends to present an alternate view of the coup being an internal army affair by focusing on the political volatility and complexity of the Indonesian military. It is valuable content wise since it is based on contemporary transcripts made by the movement, who themselves asserted that it was entirely an affair within the military.

However, the source is limited in origin since it was first produced in 1966 and subsequently published in full in 1971. Since then, other documents have been discovered like the aforementioned Supardjo document, meaning the writers did not have the benefit of hindsight to consider multiple perspectives from an assortment of historical documents. The source is also limited by its content since it omits key circumstantial evidence, like the PKI’s steadily heightening militancy and accelerating drive to power prior to the coup, to depict the PKI as the victim of a coup caused by the army.

Six of Indonesia's senior military officials were abducted and executed on September 30, 1965, by a gang of Indonesian military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, battalion commander of then-President Sukarno's bodyguard. Untung himself declared the campaign was "directed at generals who were members of the self-styled Council of Generals" and to "avoid such a counter-revolutionary coup (by the Council of Generals)" after seizing control of Radio Republik Indonesia in Jakarta.  Thus, the 30 September movement framed itself as a putsch by Sukarno-aligned forces. However, the coup attempt was a failure due to poor planning and logistical problems, which caused KOSTRAD Director-General Suharto to assume control of the army and persuade the coup-supporting battalions to abandon their objective. Suharto and his allies gained political power in the months that followed by accusing the PKI of being the movement's architects. This sparked a politicide that resulted in the murders of roughly 1 million people and the total destruction of the PKI. Supardjo asserted that the affair was "an operation led directly by the party", but historians Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey have argued that the movement was solely an internal army matter in which officers sought to exploit the PK7 of 18 leadership and Sukarno for their own gain.  Although PKI members like Kamaruzaman Sjam, who commanded the communist wing of the movement, backed the movement, the army and some PKI leaders were ultimately responsible for the coup's instigation.

The Supardjo document, in which Supardjo claims the movement's original plan was for it to "advance in stages and then suddenly shift into a completely PKI movement," provides the first indication of PKI instigation. Supardjo claims that there are three groups that make up the movement's leadership: "the Head Group, the Sam and Friends group, and the Untung and Friends group." In his testimony at the 1967 Mahmilub trials, Kamaruzaman Sjam characterized himself as the "chief of the PKI's Special Bureau" who "got orders directly from the leadership of the party". Given that PKI General Secretary D. N. Aidit was present at Halim Air Base, where the movement had President Sukarno detained, this supports the Indonesian Army's claim that the PKI was truly accountable. The involvement of volunteers from PKI groups like Pemuda Rakyat in the sub-units responsible for the generals' kidnapping and murder served as additional proof. Due to Sukarno's ill health, the PKI also wanted to be a part of the movement. Sukarno's health had long been a source of political concern, and the PKI believed that an open rupture between him and the army would leave it in an almost helpless position. The PKI, therefore, orchestrated the issue as a preventative move to protect its interests because of its leadership and the worry that Sukarno's passing would make it vulnerable.'

Furthermore, the PKI's actions leading up to and during the coup suggest a significant level of involvement. Through Sam's operations, the PKI had previously run a network of 700 "progressive officers" across the four branches of the armed services. The PKI also trained approximately 3000 people in front of the movement at Lubang Buaya. Even D. N. Aidit, who dispatched cadres to various provinces with instructions to "listen to the announcements over the Central RRI and support the Revolutionary Council," acknowledged the likelihood of a coup during sessions of the PKI Central Committee's Politburo.  A cartoon showing the 30th September Movement punching a "Council of Generals" figure supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the face was published by the Harian Rakjat on October 2 to demonstrate the publication's explicit support for the movement.  Another factor was Sukarno's outspoken backing of the PKI, which in 1957 launched its distinctive Nasakom programme, balancing nationalism, regionalism, and communism. Sukarno was adamant about getting rid of senior army officers who he believed were opposed to his desire to have Indonesia closely allied with the People's Republic of China, an aim shared by the PKI. Early in 1965, China backed Sukarno to form the Fifth Force, an armed peasant and worker militia that gave the PKI an advantage over its adversaries like the army. Workers and farmers who made up the core of the PKI and carried out the movement in various regions of the nation were given Chinese weaponry. Due to its questionable behaviour in the lead-up to the coup and proof of Sukarno's and outside assistance, the PKI is therefore accountable for the coup's progression.

Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey counter that the PKI was not at fault because the internal dynamics of the army played a key role in the coup. Discontent existed among the Diponegoro division, which carried out the coup, which may have contributed to the movement's focus on Central Java, which housed the division's military apparatus. Strong cultural differences between top officers like General Ahmed Yani, who belonged to the liberal, modernized Jakarta metropolitan elite, and members of the Diponegoro, who were firmly ingrained in traditional conservative Javanese society, played a significant influence. The reason the coup planners eliminated the Yani group among senior generals after executing Yani could also be attributed to their hatred for Yani and his socioeconomic class. Additional unhappiness was brought on by lower-level officers' dissatisfaction with difficult career possibilities, generals' corruption, and the delay in dispatching army forces to the contentious Kalimantan province. By creating the Indonesian Revolution Council, coup participants also hoped to spark a "return to the spirit of Jogja, " restoring the Indonesian Revolutionary spirit.  Therefore, to support the PKI's innocence, the coup was undertaken by revolutionary army officers who wished to rid the army of libertarian components.

Furthermore, the PKI's innocence may be established because it was not their method of operation to plan such an unforeseen violent movement. Under Sukarno's Guided democracy, the PKI was a well-organized party that was included in the system. Moreover, Aidit was never brought to a public trial to defend his acts; he was executed in advance, contradicting the army's assertion that the PKI was responsible for his presence at Halim Air Base. It is also possible to debunk the idea that China was involved in the coup. Even if the Chinese supported the coup's objectives, the operation's secrecy made it unlikely that specifics of the coup's planning would be made public. Therefore, the case is not strong enough to assign the PKI sole blame for the coup, supporting their innocence. This is owing to the uncertainty of the evidence for the PKI's involvement in 11 of 18 cases.

Despite the absence of specific evidence, several PKI leaders, including Sam and Aidit, did go above their authority and work with Army officers to plan the coup. They attacked specific Army generals, depicting them as dictatorial, corrupt, and possibly working with the CIA. However, even though the Sam at Mahmilub trials demonstrates some PKI accountability, they were staged in order to cast blame on the PKI65; as a result, the level of accountability given to the PKI may have been inflated. Those that tried were frequently tortured in the beginning. 66 Furthermore, it was clear that the movement was not purely the party's idea because local cadres in Central Java said they had no prior knowledge of the coup and were completely perplexed during it. The Army had anticipated such a movement with American assistance68 and intended to "exploit its (the movement's) opportunity to move against12 of 18 the PKI," according to recently revealed CIA records. 69 This calls into question the Army's assertion that the PKI was the only driver of the movement and suggests that it was actually utilizing the movement as a cover to remove the PKI.

In conclusion, the movement was neither instigated by the PKI nor army officials alone, instead, it was a collaboration by certain members of PKI leadership and dissident army officials. Thus, it was launched as a preventative measure against the right-wing high command.

The first difficulty I encountered—and one I discussed with historians—was sorting among competing theories. While historians Notosusanto and Saleh believe the PKI was behind the movement, Anderson and McVey claim it was an entirely internal army affair. To solve the problem, I consulted recent scholarship, such as Roosa’s Pretext for Mass Murder which presented new interpretations and synthesis of views, suggesting it was a collaborative effort and the Army had anticipated such a movement. I looked at a variety of original documents, including speeches, judicial proceedings, and even a cartoon that captured the movement's members' current viewpoints. The need of using a variety of sources for historians to ensure higher trustworthiness was brought home to me as I gathered various materials.

Another difficulty I encountered was the historical negationism and selective omission practised by some Indonesian historians in order to support Suharto's New Order philosophy. For instance, Notosusanto and Saleh had mostly relied on Sam's confessions during a staged trial, which was never sufficiently established in the eyes of Western academics. Such publications were frequently polemical and exaggerated the brutality of the PKI killings while omitting to acknowledge the widespread post-movement massacres that claimed almost a million lives. The only record made by a coup participant prior to Supardjo's 14 of 18 arrests, Supardjo's document, was used by Roosa and other authors to help me overcome this. This taught me how crucial it is for historians to assess the reliability of their sources and the context in which they were compiled.

I also had to deal with censorship, which is a challenge that other historians have. I discovered that Suharto's regime had extensively suppressed conversations and papers pertaining to the incident in an effort to determine whether Suharto's group had any involvement in the movement that would seriously harm their reputation as the nation's "saviours." I got around this by gaining access to recently declassified records from US archives, and I discovered unequivocal proof of Suharto's side working with the CIA to foresee the coup and take control of the country, severely compromising their credibility.