To what extent was the collaboration carried out in space between the us and the ussr in the years prior to, and culminating in, the apollo-soyuz testproject (1975) a diplomatic endeavour

This essay aims to explore the question: “To what extent was the collaboration carried out in space between the US and the USSR in the years prior to, and culminating in, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (1975) a diplomatic endeavour?”. The focus of this investigation will be the years leading up to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) and the project itself, as its relevance in the field of space cooperation is substantial.

 

Source 1 - Ross-Nazzal, Jennifer. “Détente on Earth and in Space - The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.” OAH Magazine of History 24, no. 3 (2010) - 29–34. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/25701419.

 

This secondary source proved helpful in gaining a general understanding of the ASTP and its close relation with détente policies carried out by both the US and USSR. The origin of the source was valuable, as Ross-Nazzal is the historian at the NASA Johnson Space Center in Houston, enabling her to have first-hand access to primary sources in archives and give an educated and well- documented view on the project. The purpose of the source is both a limitation and a value, for the OAH Magazine of History aimed to provide high schools and colleges with accessible US history material . Thus, the article was easy to understand, but lacked the deep and detailed analysis other 2 historical studies could have provided. The content of the article is a value, as the ASTP, and the agreements leading up to it, are thoroughly described, and many primary sources, such as telegrams or internal memoranda, are cited. However, being the article written by an American historian in NASA, for an American journal, Ross-Nazzal is biased in mostly providing the American perspective on the project, omitting the Soviet point of view, proving the content a limitation under this aspect.

 

Source 2 - Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Gerald Ford, October 10, 1975.

 

This letter was the most important primary source in understanding the Soviets’ view on the ASTP and collaboration with the USA. The origin of the document, the USSR’s chairman Leonid Brezhnev, is a value, as the letter was written by the leader himself, thus the statements contained in it are official and provide a first hand account into the Kremlin’s views. However, the nature of its origin provides historians only with the Soviet perspective, limiting its utility only in discussions that take into account that point of view. The source’s date represents another limitation in its origin, for the letter was sent after the project’s completion, not specifically dealing with the aims and expectations on the ASTP by the Soviet part. The purpose of the letter is both a value and a limitation. It is valuable as Brezhnev wrote to Ford in order to demonstrate that the USSR viewed the project as successful and a watershed in US-USSR collaboration, stressing the fact that he believes endeavours such as the ASTP should be brought forward and repeated in the future. However, Brezhnev, and consequently the source, are limited because they are biased, as the chairman would have omitted any problems or failures of the project, in order to portray the USSR in a better way. The content of the source is a value: Brezhnev exposes his positive views on the project, stating that it was a success, exposing how the USSR was seeking collaboration with the USA, and how a policy of cooperation was rooted in the government and in the chairman’s will, evidence which was important in developing the argument from the soviet perspective.

In May 1972, with the signing of an US-USSR agreement in which the two countries envisioned “the docking of a United States Apollo-type spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft” in 1975, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) was born. This agreement grew  to become the first international space mission, laying the foundation for other projects such as the Shuttle-Mir Program (1994) and the ISS (1998) . In the later years of the Cold  War, the US and USSR, after narrowly avoiding nuclear destruction as a consequence of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, understood that international tensions needed to be brought down , and space collaboration was a promising medium through which to  reach this goal . In a November 1962 telegram to the Central Committee by soviet envoy G.  Zhukov regarding a conversation with presidential advisor J. McCloy, the envoy reports that McCloy suggested a possible joint US-USSR space mission, while discussing “further prospects for American-Soviet cooperation that will open as a result of the settlement of the Cuban crisis” . Throughout this investigation, primary sources such as international  telegrams and memoranda will be of focus, analysing the aims and expected outcomes of the ASTP from the American and Soviet perspectives, showing how the project was for the great part a diplomatic endeavour. The expected outcomes and general aims of the ASTP can firstly be analysed from the USA’s perspective. Initial talks on the project stemmed from the Kennedy administration, as early as 1961. While congratulating USSR’s premier Khrushchev on Yuri Gagarin’s first successful orbital flight, Kennedy proposed space exploration as a field for collaboration, in order to “obtain the greatest benefit to mankind” . Without doubt, Kennedy alluded to the  scientific gains brought by collaboration, as he did in the State of the Union Message of 29 January 1961 . However, he also made reference to the better condition that the world  would experience if the two superpowers were to work together and improve their relationship. Primary sources from the Nixon administration also show how the main goal of the ASTP and space cooperation was to improve diplomatic ties with the USSR. In a presidential memorandum from 10 July 1970, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger states that Nixon decided that joint projects in space with the USSR “should be pursued simultaneously through high-level diplomatic and technical agency channels” . This 10 source demonstrates how Nixon wanted to include space as a field for collaboration in his détente policy. The presidential administration pushed for cooperation in space, especially stressing the need for a joint mission: the ASTP, talks for which started as early as 1969 . In an interview fourteen years after the project, Glynn Lunney, the director of the ASTP, stated that “the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was a part of that general thrust” of Nixon’s foreign policy attempts in “engaging the Soviet Union and trying to find areas of common ground” . The testimony reveals how the détente policy permeated NASA and the ASTP’s  board of directors in the 70s. Furthermore, it shows that the director of the project understood the primary aims of the endeavour, which were softening the relations with the USSR. All these sources demonstrate that the ASTP was deeply rooted in Nixon’s foreign policy, objective of which was to reduce US-USSR tensions. Being the project part of said policies, the sources validate the claim that the ASTP was a diplomatic and strategic effort to improve and build new ties with the Soviet Union.

 

The same analysis can be conducted from the Soviet perspective, uncovering how the USSR and its government had as an aim the one to collaborate with the US in space in order to reduce hostility. As soon as 1961, a few days before Yuri Gagarin’s Vostok 1 launch, Khrushchev, in a note regarding proposals linked to the upcoming mission, wrote that “for the successful advancement of humanity in the conquest of science [...], it is necessary to ensure peace”. Despite not making any specific reference to the ASTP or to other collaborative missions with the USA, the note shows the Soviets’ willingness to collaborate with “all countries of the world, [...] regardless of [their] social and political structure” , in  a quest to ensure peace and heal international relations. Almost fifteen years later, in a letter to the USA’s newly elected president Gerald R. Ford, Leonid Brezhnev commented on the joint project, calling it “confirmation of the [...] improvement of the Soviet- American relations”, and defining the astronauts “messengers of good will”, that represent each country’s eagerness to work collaboratively in order to achieve peace and improve relations. This letter shows how the Soviets had as a general aim in their foreign policy, and especially with the joint project, to foster “good relations between our countries [US and USSR]” , showing how the USSR felt satisfied with the outcome of the project,  implying that one original aim of the ASTP was to create new bonds and better existing ones with the US. These two primary sources are a display of the USSR’s willingness to cooperate with the US in order to improve diplomatic ties, and how these efforts were in part concentrated in space collaboration and more specifically in the ASTP.

 

Some might argue that the ASTP, and all collaborative efforts leading up to it, were mostly a scientific endeavour. The US and USSR's space agencies would join their efforts, in order to have more possibilities thanks to the shared resources and knowledge, as previously agreed with the “Summary of Results of Discussions on Space Cooperation between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration” of 21 January 1971 , showing how there was a push towards collaboration  as a means of gaining more scientific knowledge. As Jennifer Ross-Nazzal states, “NASA’s shrinking budget forced the agency to look for ways to do more with less” . One of the  ways to increase scientific gains and reduce costs is collaboration with other space agencies; thus the two countries would want to collaborate in order to have more funds available, or, as secretary of state Henry Kissinger states in a briefing memo to President Ford, the project would have given NASA an opportunity to “gain more insights into the utility of space than they could from separate programs” . This shows how the ASTP’s  planning also took into account scientific gains resulting from cooperation. Furthermore, the ASTP would provide the US and USSR a compatible docking and rendezvous system, showing that “the benefits of the mission include contributions to a rescue capability for future manned space flights”. These sources show how planning for the ASTP also included factors other than the political ones, such as the increased scientific gains compared to the costs, and the implementation of a common docking system for safety reasons. However, the diplomatic factors, as previously analysed, were the leading reasons that pushed the two countries to seek for a common ground in which to carry out collaboration, basis for peace and the improvement of relations between the US and the USSR in the Cold War .

 

Therefore, it can be concluded that the ASTP, and the Soviet-American collaboration efforts carried out in space prior to the project, mainly had as an aim a diplomatic one. The two administrations wanted to decrease tensions between the two countries, and space collaboration was one of the fields chosen. There is ample evidence that supports this claim, ranging from international telegrams to governmental memorandums, making the ASTP a significant, yet not very renowned, step towards the relaxation of tensions during the Cold War.

This investigation gave me the opportunity to have a first-hand experience of the methods and difficulties faced by historians while carrying out research. In order to be able to answer my research question with a structured and logical argument, I had to go through the process of collecting, analysing and incorporating many sources in my investigation. I feel like I have developed an important skill in the field of history: being able to identify, select and evaluate a source both in its values and limitations, and in its relevance to my argument, as I often found sources related to my topic, but that didn’t give a concrete contribution to my argument, showing how a historian has to be able to select the right sources to support their argument.

 

During my study, I had to be careful not to be biased, especially not to fall in the trap of confirmation bias, as I could have only considered the sources that supported my hypothesis. For this reason, I had to go through a great amount of material, mostly primary sources, and only then could I prove that my assumption had been correct. This uncovered a limitation in history: totally avoiding bias in one’s work is not possible, as is in Ross-Nazzal’s article , but it can be limited. Bias is an aspect of research that historians 19 have to be careful of, especially confirmation bias, as it can put the historian off and prevent an all-round perspective on the topic, fundamental to give a complete evaluation of it, to be seen.

 

At the start of my investigation, I found it difficult to give a reasonable and well-supported answer to my research question, however, after going through a range of different material, I understood that a totally correct and absolute truth cannot exist in history, as there are many different perspectives to take into account. Furthermore, one historian can prove a point by providing supportive evidence and omitting sources that demonstrate his hypothesis wrong, showing how providing a global perspective is important in history. This consideration also led me to include some sources that proved my assumption wrong, such as the Kissinger memo , as this was crucial to provide a more accurate view on the topic,  taking into account different perspectives and evidence on the topic.

Primary sources -

• Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, translated by Sarah Dunn for the National Security Archive, Telegram from G. Zhukov to the Central Committee of the CPSU on a conversation with John McCloy (November 2, 1962).
• Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Gerald Ford (October 10, 1975).
• Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Meeting with Soviet Cosmonauts, The White House, (September 7, 1974).
• National Archives, Agreement concerning Cooperation in the Exploration of the Use of Outer Space for the Peaceful Purposes (May 24, 1972).
• John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, President’s Telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, The White House, (April 12, 1961).
• John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, State of the Union Message, (January 29, 1961).
• JSC History Collection, Glynn S. Lunney, interview by Carol Butler, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, (February 8, 1999).
• Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, translated by Sarah Dunn for the National Security Archive, Proposals in connection with the launch of the “Vostok” spacecraft with Yuri Gagarin, (April 11, 1961).
• Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Decision Memorandum 70, National Security Council, (July 10, 1970).
• International Cooperation in Outer Space - A Symposium. United States - U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Secondary sources -

• “About the Journal,” Academic.oup.com, accessed May 18, 2022, https://academic.oup.com/ maghis/pages/About.
• Colman, Jonathan. Cuban Missile Crisis - Origins, Course and Aftermath. Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
• Dunn, Sarah. “U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Outer Space, Part 1 - From Yuri Gagarin to Apollo- Soyuz”. National Security Archive, April 12, 2021. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/ russia-programs/2021-04-12/us-soviet-cooperation-in-outer-space-part-1-1961-1975.
• Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. The partnership: A NASA history of the Apollo- Soyuz test project. Courier Corporation, 2013.
• Krasnyak, Olga. "The Apollo–Soyuz Test Project: Construction of an Ideal Type of Science Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 13, 4 (2018): 410-431, doi: https://doi.org/ 10.1163/1871191X-12341028.
• Ross-Nazzal, Jennifer. “Détente on Earth and in Space: The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.” OAH Magazine of History 24, no. 3 (2010) - 29–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25701419.
• U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-STI-27), 1985.