How far were hitler’s intentions clear for britain when negotiating with chamberlain during the munich meeting?

This investigation seeks to answer the question -  How far were Hitler’s intentions clear for Britain when negotiating with Chamberlain during the Munich Meeting? Hitler was blamed for the outbreak of the Second World War (1939-1945), marked by the violation of the Munich Agreement (1938) and the subsequent invasion of Poland. Therefore, this investigation can be considered historically interesting as it delves into various perspectives and evidence that considers that Neville Chamberlain could have been aware of the multitude of indications that revealed Hitler's intentions. If therefore this hypothesis were true, it would introduce the concept of a double guilt: a guilt not limited only to Hitler, but also extended to Chamberlain.

 

This investigation was built using a wide range of sources, two of which stand out. A primary source, which contributed with firsthand information of what happened during a meeting relevant to the question, and a secondary source which assisted with one historian's perspective.

 

The National Archives. (1938). Extracts from the minutes of the conversation between Chamberlain and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Retrieved on September 2023 from The National Archives.

 

This primary source is valuable for the investigation regarding the origin because it was published in The National Archives, where documents are received from governmental agencies, and are carefully documented ensuring its authenticity. In terms of its purpose, the source is valuable because it avoids future misunderstandings, offering an incontrovertible record of the words exchanged between the two leaders in 1938. Lastly, considering the value of the content, the source presents insight into the arguments presented by both leaders regarding the Sudetenland situation, significant to understand the extent to which Chamberlain knew about Hitler’s true foreign policy.

 

On the other hand, the source does not present any limitation regarding the origin of the investigation. However, regarding the purpose it shows an incomplete picture of the situation as it emanates from the perspective of only one of the involved parties (the British government), which is why more sources have been used during the investigation. In addition, the source has limitations in the content as there are instances where the narrative transitions from literal transcription to a summary of the dialogue, resulting in information scarcity.

 

McDonough. F (2011). The Origins of the Second World War. An International Perspective. Continnuum-3PL.

 

This secondary source is valuable for the investigation regarding the origin because each chapter is written by scholars and historians who are all experts in their fields. They bring diverse perspectives and insights to the book, enriching its content. Regarding the purpose, the source holds value as it brings together different perspectives about the causes of the Second World War. This compilation facilitates the research process of the period investigated, beyond the targeted topic, for a broader understanding of the context. Considering the content, it is valuable 5 as one of the chapters consulted directly addresses the research question, defending that Chamberlain’s instincts were clouded by his judgment.

 

On the other hand, the source’s origin is limited due to its publication in 2011, lacking updated information or new perspectives on the subject matter. The purpose has limitations as the book title, with the phrase “from an international perspective”, suggests it covers topics such as “The Era of Japanese Militarism” which was of no interest to the investigation. Additionally, the content’s scope is unfocused, as the book mentions all the causes of the Second World War, not only the period investigated.

The policy of territorial expansion of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), the German Fuhrer, aimed to achieve unity of the German people. The desired Anschluss with Austria was achieved in March of 1938, not long after, he demanded the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia due to its ethnic German population. Simultaneously, France and Britain, seeking to avoid conflict, pressured the Czechoslovak president to surrender all the areas that contained more than half of German population. The President was politically isolated and had no other choice than to step aside (Gilfoyle & Janes, 2013). That same year, the Munich Agreement (30 September 1938) was signed agreeing on Hitler’s demands of expansion included in the Godesberg Memorandum (24 September 1938), expecting no more European expansion at the hands of Hitler. On September 1st, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, raising the question of whether Neville Chamberlain (1869- 1940), the British Prime Minister, knew of Hitler’s plans.

 

Chamberlain contemplated the likelihood of Hitler violating the Munich Agreement, as he had been cautioned on multiple occasions. Winston Churchill (1874-1965), a British politician from the Conservative Party and later Prime Minister (1940-1945; 1951-1955), dedicated part of his career to expressing concerns about Hitler’s intentions, especially after the Nazis came to power in 1933. Churchill would be remembered as the individual who, as early as 1939, predicted the invasion of Poland in an article for the Daily Telegraph (American’s National Churchill Museum, 2023). However, at that time, Chamberlain remained unpersuaded by Churchill’s influence and insisted on pursuing “Plan Z”, which involved meeting with Hitler (The Desert Sun, 1969). In their second meeting in Godesberg on September 22, 1938, Hitler decided to raise the demands (Shirer, 1998) regarding the Sudetenland transfer from Czechoslovakia to Germany, aware of Chamberlain’s willingness to avoid war at all costs. Unbothered by an action that should have set the alarms off, Chamberlain still managed to find reasons to believe that an agreement was possible and chose to dismiss the accusations promoted by his surroundings. According to historian A.J.P Taylor, Hitler did not have a clear plan, and Chamberlain could not be blamed for not anticipating Hitler’s actions (Taylor, 1991). However, this perspective is difficult to sustain, as it seems Hitler’s ambitious character was easily anticipated by Churchill without Hitler needing an expansionist plan, suggesting Chamberlain had the necessary information to question Hitler’s genuineness.

 

Moreover, Chamberlain focused on buying time for rearming in anticipation of an inevitable war against Germany. The skepticism Chamberlain had towards Hitler was evident in a November 26, 1937 letter where he conveyed the vision that despite Hitler and Goering’s claims of not wanting war, they were planning to invade Eastern Europe and move closer to Austria (Feiling, 1970). This perspective was addressed by historian Keith Feiling who considered that later in October of that same year, after their meeting in Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain saw Hitler as “an abnormal, incalculable individual surrounded by evil advisers” (Feiling, 1970), which made him believe he had not achieved lasting peace. This reprobatory description of Hitler seems credible as Chamberlain, an experienced politician, had to have perceived his uncompromising posture and the superiority with which Hitler spoke to those he deemed inferior. Chamberlain accepted that the agreement was not going to be respected, and since Britain was not ready to fight (Feiling, 1970), rearming during the negotiations became the only choice to contain the threat. The increase in defense expenditure from 1935 to 1939 suggested preparations for rearmament (Shay, 1979), with an acceleration in 1936 of 21% after the Rhineland Crisis (March 7, 1936). This suggeststhat Chamberlain was not fooled, had a clear opinion of Hitler’s dishonest behavior, and was aware that the negotiations would not lead to a favorable outcome. It also supports Feiling’s perspective and strengthens the argument that the Munich Agreement was primarily a tactic to buy time, making this argument the most convincing.

 

However, although Chamberlain knew the country ́s faith was to go to war, he seized the opportunity to safeguard Britain against potential neglections of Hitler’s agreement. The Anglo- German declaration (Chamberlain & Hitler, 1938) was signed just after the Munich Agreement. While this second document may not have stopped Hitler from invading Europe, its significance lay in providing Chamberlain with the means to expose Hitler as the evil man that he was. It was a symbolic agreement, without legal weight (what helped Hitler in agreeing to it) for Hitler to publicly commit to peace. However, Chamberlain naively believed that it would make Hitler hesitate to initiate war, but history would prove him wrong. He knew “peace in our time” (Hacken, Neville Chamberlain's "Peace for our time" speech, 2018) “would be over in three months” (Feiling, 1970).

 

Nevertheless, some historians argue that Chamberlain may not have known Hitler’s true intentions because he was directly lied to and manipulated. The transcript of their September 15, 1938 meeting in Berchtesgaden (The National Archives, 1938), gives an explicit view of what Hitler’s lying strategies were, including the unfulfilled promises said to Chamberlain in their meeting, as later contrasted with what happened. Hitler initially emphasized his demands for the Sudetenland and downplayed the idea of Germany with territories outside its borders, indirectly suggesting an interest only in Czechoslovakia. In response to Chamberlain’s uncertainty, he gave long and confusing speeches going off topic trying to seem confident about settling the situation while circling back to their original position. In addition, Hitler cared to keep Chamberlain content to avoid any conflict, so he began by reconsidering the previously denied Godesberg Memorandum. This made Chamberlain believe that their relationship was building stronger and more confident, a sentiment with which Hitler had to agree (Shirer, 1998). On September 28, Hitler sent a letter that the historian William L. Shirer described as “beautifully calculated to appeal to Chamberlain” (Shirer, 1998). With a moderate tone, promising to negotiate and to give a guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia, he talked Chamberlain into settling everything in the Munich Agreement, proving Shirer was right when he said Hitler knew how to convince people.

 

Furthermore, Chamberlain trusted Hitler despite all the warnings because he only saw what he wanted to see (McDonough, 2011), a trustworthy Hitler who would spare England from entering a war they were not prepared for. Britain had just stepped out of the Second World War (1914- 1918) less than twenty years earlier. A Great War that had caused devastation in the form of one million casualties, unemployment, and harsh living conditions (America's National Churchill Museum, 2023). By 1919, Britain had abandoned conscription and was in no condition for another war (McDonough, 2011). After their meeting on September 15, 1938, Chamberlain 10 reported that he had seen no signs of insanity in Hitler but instead signs of enthusiasm (The Desert Sun, 1969), he was confident about Hitler’s loyalty, mistakenly assuming that the dictator’s intentions appeared to have an affinity with the British (Charmley, 1989). Accepting the alternative perspective, meant acknowledging that war was the most likely outcome, so Chamberlain chose to rely on his intuition and trust in Hitler, the only figure that was giving him the hope he wanted, the possibility to avoid war (McDonough, 2011). Some historians argue that his desire to avoid war at all costs led to muddled decisions that abandoned Czechoslovakia and marginalized Churchill, which led Britain into a war that could indeed have been avoided. However, it seems probable that Hitler’s plans would not have changed, and the war would have started either way.

 

Despite Hitler’s well-known reputation for dishonesty and Chamberlain’s strong desire to avoid war, Chamberlain was indeed aware of Hitler's intentions. Right from the beginning, he received warnings and expressed his suspicions in his diaries and letters. Rather than being deceived, Chamberlain used Hitler’s attempts at manipulation as an opportunity to buy time and prepare his country for the upcoming conflict. The existence of the Anglo-German declaration, Chamberlain’s diary entries, and the increase in government spending on rearmament, all point to his understanding of the true nature of Hitler’s ambitions. We can now ask ourselves who was the greater liar, but it is evident that Hitler’s efforts to fool Chamberlain proved unsuccessful.

During this research, I encountered challenges commonly faced by historians, particularly the task of interpreting primary sources. When examining documents such as the Anglo-German Declaration, I had to delve beyond the explicit text. Initially, based on the surface appearance, I assumed Chamberlain had written it to consolidate a collaborative relationship between Germany and Britain. However, this interpretation felt inadequate after reading historians’ opinions on Chamberlain possibly anticipating Hitler’s expansionist aims. My prior research on the topic gave me a context that enabled me to comprehend Chamberlain was untrustworthy of Hitler and that securing Britain might have been his main priority. The timing of the document, signed after the Munich Agreement rather than before, was a crucial clue linking it to this context. Having knowledge of their previous interactions and the agendas of each leader, I realized that the Anglo-German Declaration was a strategic measure to safeguard Britain against a possible offensive by Hitler if he publicly committed to peace between the two countries. While primary sources are highly used by historians due to their immunity from prior interpretations and their proximity to the events studied, they can be the most challenging to decipher. Therefore, having a well-established contextual understanding is key.

 

Another common challenge faced by historians, which I also encountered during my investigation, was dealing with unconscious bias. One of the central figures in my research was Hitler, a man with a reprehensible reputation, which made it inevitable to have a preconceived opinion against him. Even though I believed I was maintaining complete objectivity, I found myself doubting information suggesting that Chamberlain might have been as aware as Hitler of his plans for Germany. In my mind, Chamberlain could not have been an accomplice of Hitler. When I had to make the selection of sources, I realized I did not know if I was selecting or if I was just being biased. I understand selection as choosing a source over another based on objective reasons, such as if the source provides a different perspective or if it’s academic. On the other hand, being biased is making choices unconsciously, driven by preconceived ideas on the topic. I believe I have included a balanced review of arguments and sources which were not influenced by preconceived ideas created by cultural biases, or perceptions.

America's National Churchill Museum. (2023). Gathering Storm. Retrieved from America's National Churchill Museum: https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/winston-churchill-and-the- gathering-storm.html

 

Chamberlain, N., & Hitler, A. (1938). The Anglo-German Declaration. Retrieved from IWM: https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1030005003

 

Charmley, J. (1989). Dealing with Hitler. In J. Charmley, Chamberlain and the lost peace (pp. 105-119). Ivan R Dee.

 

Feiling, K. (1970). The life of Neville Chamberlain. McMillan and Co..

 

Gilfoyle, D., & Janes, A. (2013). The Munich Agreement . Retrieved from The National Archives : https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/the-munich-agreement/

 

Hacken, R. (2018). Neville Chamberlain's "Peace For Our Time" speech. Retrieved from BYU Harold B. Lee Library-

https://eudocs.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Neville_Chamberlain%27s_%22Peace_For_Our_Time%22_speech

 

McDonough, F. (2011). When Instinct Clouds Judgement: Neville Chamberlain and the Pursuit of Appeasement with Nazi Germany, 1937-9. In F. McDonough, The Origins of the Second World War. An International Perspective (pp. 186-205). Continnuum-3PL.

 

Ripsman, N. M., & Levy, J. S. (2008). Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s. Retrieved from Rutgers: https://fas- polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/articles/2008%20Wishful%20Thinking%20or%20Buying%20Time.pdf

 

Shay, R. P. (1979). From Munich To War . In R. P. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (pp. 228-281). Princeton University Press.

 

Shirer, W. (1998). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster.

 

Taylor, A.J.P. (1991). The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin Books

 

The Desert Sun. (1969). Churchill warned Chamberlain on Appeasement, notes reveal. The Desert Sun, 5.

 

The National Archives. (1938). Chamberlain and Hitler 1938. Retrieved on September 2023 from The National Archives: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/chamberlain-and- hitler/