Discuss this statement with reference to two areas of knowledge

To be completely certain of a knowledge claim is to be indubitably sure of its truth. Yet this complete certainty over claims and beliefs only results when the relevant belief/claim-formation process admits no possibility of error. Since a prima facie look across the Areas of Knowledge (AOKs) reveals no such error-free belief/claim-formation processes, complete certainty may always be out of reach. In contrast, on a weaker conception of what it means to be certain of claims — perhaps having sufficient surety of their truth "for application to ordinary life, something adequately provided for by merely accounting for all available evidence — we may nevertheless be "certain enough" of some of our knowledge claims. This essay will examine both whether we are "completely certain" or merely "certain enough" in the AOKs of the Natural Sciences and History.

Firstly, knowledge formation in the Natural Sciences may be problematic due to the issue with Foundationalism — the belief that theories in the Natural Sciences are derived from axioms, which by nature are self-evident and unprovable, essentially making them foundational assumptions. However, since these assumptions are not empirically proven, there is no concrete basis to believe they are indubitably true, subjecting them to a degree of uncertainty. This is further illustrated by some axioms not holding true after they have been established. As axioms can be disproven despite their “self-evidence”, it is only fair to assume that they have the possibility of being subjected to such dismantling, underscoring their uncertainty. An example of such a situation occurring is in the field of astrophysics, where advancements in non-Euclidean geometry has casted doubt on the dimensionality and shape of the universe, disproving the foundational assumption that the universe is flat. Hence, problems surrounding Foundationalism in the Natural Sciences mars the possibility of them being completely certain in all cases.

Secondly, the Natural Sciences also relies on a system of inductive reasoning, which is problematic. Inductive reasoning is conducted through the generalisation of a small set of observations. This is an issue as explained by Hume’s problem of induction, which states that for generalisations to be true, it assumes nature obeys a law-like regularity, remaining constant at all times and spaces — an assumption that is justified because repeated attempts of the inductive process yield similar outcomes — but is flawed since this is not replicable at every given space and time. As such, there is some doubt regarding a theory’s correctness in both the past before it was first tested and in the future where it has not been tested, thereby failing to be completely certain. For example, the law of conservation of momentum is demonstrated by observing a closed system before and after an event, showing that total momentum remains constant throughout. This outcome has been proven correct for many variations/repetitions, making it assumed to be correct for all instances based on the law-like regularity — which is flawed as mentioned previously. Thus, we are rarely completely certain in the Natural Sciences due to the problems surrounding induction.

Despite complete certainty being rare, it is arguable that we are nevertheless frequently certain enough in the Natural Sciences if knowledge derived from it is applicable to ordinary life — where our observations do not contradict theories. The Natural Sciences appear to frequently follow this, since the theories that are adopted generally do not contradict phenomena. If observations or experiments do contradict an existing theory, it is usually discarded; this means that scientific knowledge is almost always accurate with respect to the empirical evidence that is directly/indirectly available within a given time period. An Instance of such an occurrence is the geocentric theory, which stated that celestial objects orbited around earth. However, following observed phenomena with certain planets periodically disappearing and reappearing, it contradicted this theory leading to its eventual rejection. Thus, as the Natural Sciences often ensures that its theories account for all observed phenomena, it is frequently certain enough.

Contrarily, the Natural Sciences sometimes adopt theories which have been disproven. Since these theories contradict observed phenomena, they fail to meet the criteria of being certain enough. This may be done as such incorrect theories provide value to us beyond accounting for what we observe — being accepted for other reasons such as convenience; an example of which is the Dot and Cross diagram in Chemistry. It is used to visualise atoms and electron clouds in a 3-diamensional space on a 2-diamensional background but has been proven to not accurately depict our observations of said electrons’ position. Hence, the Natural Sciences may not be certain enough in various cases as it forgoes accounting for observations in favour of other reasons.

Besides the Natural Sciences, History also faces numerous problems in its knowledge formation. Firstly, historical claims are based on consolidating various pieces of evidence into coherent strings through inferences; however, these claims are limited by the availability of evidences — which have to survive the passage of time either through viva voce or avoiding being destroyed until it is accessible to historians who wish to utilize them. When sources are lost, it makes such claims dubious due to missing links which could affect the historical narrative. This is problematic as historians evidently have no means to identify if and which sources are absent from accepted narratives, preventing such claims from being indubitably true and thus not being completely certain. This is seen with the recent discovery of human fossils found outside of Africa which dated back 50000 years more than the accepted date for humans’ first migration outside of the continent. The uncovering of previously unknown evidence believed to be lost has thus made our initial interpretation of this historical claim incorrect. Hence, the nature of sources in History prevents its claims from being completely certain.

Furthermore, historians also face issues pertaining to the unobservability of events they try to describe. Even if we assume that historians can account for all evidence and interpret them into a coherent string, they are not repeatable. As an illustration, there will never be another World War 2 with Hitler and Churchill leading their nations — any conflict involving Germany and England now cannot be applied to the original accepted historical event to certify it as concrete truth. Direct observation serves the role of confirming historical facts — akin to how the Natural Sciences repeats experiments to confirm theories, but since this is not possible, it will never be undoubtedly true irrespective of how unanimous any historical fact may be. Thus, the unobservability of events which makes them not replicable, causes history to seldom be completely certain.

On the other hand, History can often be certain enough despite its problems in knowledge formation. Historiography may not aim to create a narrative that is an exact retelling of past events, but instead rationally justify pieces of evidence that we have access to. Since historical evidence such as human recounts may be contradictory, resolving such contradictions would satisfy the above condition. This is done through assessing the reliability of sources by evaluating possible biases or defects, accounting for conflicting evidence as this method weaves out ‘bad’ pieces of evidence which are relegated to a lesser standing. Historians commonly practice thisin most historical work, even being present in the IB History syllabus. OPCVL (Origin, Purpose, Content, Value, Limitation) is a technique that is taught to students, which encourages critical evaluation when analysing the validity of a source. As such, historical fact is formed around “valuable” sources while disregarding “limited” ones, thereby accounting for all evidences. Thus, the widespread use of evaluating sources helps align historical evidence and fact, allowing historians to be frequently certain enough.

Even so, those who determine which sources should be valued over others are liable to biases which influences their judgement. Historians are inherently flawed as they implicitly apply their current cultural context on a past event. This is inevitable when evaluating sources, as we have to ultimately fill in some context based on the incomplete fragments of past evidence. Due to this, competing historical facts may be formed by historians who “value” contradicting sources, in turn failing to account for all evidence. For example, French historians value sources which depict their forces as crucial during the Battle of Normandy during World War 2, contrasting how American historians choose sources which portray themselves as the main liberators. Therefore, we may seldom be certain enough in history due to the unavoidable biases which can alter historians’ interpretations of evidence.

In conclusion, complete certainty in all scenarios, where no level of doubt exists is essentially impossible. The Natural Sciences faces problems in the process by which its theories are crafted. History also has issues with its knowledge production — due to its unrepeatability of claims and also by the limited nature of its evidence. Regarding being certain enough, both AOKs generally work towards accounting for all available evidence but is not always the case; they are subject to value beyond certainty and subjectivity issues respectively. Having said that, the question is unfair to not only the Natural Sciences and History, but to other AOKs as well since it insinuates that being “certain enough” is held to the same standard in each AOK. To illustrate, being certain enough in the Natural Sciences may relate to practicality in its theories, which makes adopting ‘wrong’ theories like the Dot and Cross model acceptable. In History, ‘multiperspectivity’ acknowledges that the discipline is subjective, meaning being certain enough is held to a lesser standing than as defined here. Therefore, while complete certainty is relatively straightforward to answer, the frequency of being certain enough is more complex — perhaps requiring specific analysis with respect to different AOKs.

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